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INSUFFICIENT ANALYSIS OF
INSUFFICIENT ACTIVITY
Kenneth S. Abraham*†
A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient
Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich L. Rev. 277 (2009).

In Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts,
David Gilo and Ehud Guttel argue that negligence law encourages inefficiently high and low levels of activity because negligence law ordinarily
does not take activity levels into account. They suggest that the law should
impose liability for failing to take safety precautions—even where precautions would not be cost-justified—whenever the threat of this liability
negates the incentive for an actor to choose an insufficient level of activity.
Until now, the literature on the interaction between liability standards and
activity levels has failed to recognize the possibility of inefficiently insufficient activity. I commend Gilo and Guttel for both their insight and their
explication of it.
Despite the novel analysis of an interesting omission in tort law scholarship, the proposal for insufficient activity liability (“IAL”) would greatly
complicate tort litigation, and the authors offer no evidence that it would
deliver significant benefits in return. Rather, this theory of liability would
create several new problems, for which the authors propose no solutions.
First, IAL is riddled with causal uncertainties that the authors do not fully
acknowledge. Second, juries may impose IAL unreliably because they
would consider IAL an unwarranted infringement on autonomy. Third, the
adoption of IAL would create fact-finding difficulties that conventional negligence and traditional strict liability do not face. In short, the authors’
analysis of how IAL would work in practice is insufficient.
I. Causal Responsibility and the Scope of Liability
Gilo and Guttel recognize that IAL will require proof of a causal connection between the defendant’s failure to take a precaution that is not costjustified and the plaintiff’s injury. But they too easily dismiss the uncertainties that this requirement will generate. They use a number of different
terms for this form of liability, sometimes calling it “strict liability” and
elsewhere calling it “negligence liability” for “failures to invest in precau*
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tions whose cost is higher than their benefit in reducing harm.” It is true that
imposing liability for failure to take a precaution that is not cost-justified is
a version of “strict liability,” in that it is liability without fault. But the use
of the various terms is problematic because strict liability and negligence
apply different causation requirements.
Different forms of IAL would have different implications for proving
causation. In negligence cases, a defendant is not liable unless the plaintiff
would not have been injured but for the defendant’s failure to take a costjustified precaution. In contrast, traditional activity-based strict liability requires no causal connection between the precautions the defendant did or
did not take and the injury the plaintiff suffered. All injuries arising out of
the characteristic risks of conducting the activity result in liability.
The proposal for IAL appears to contemplate a negligence-like causation
requirement. IAL would be imposed only if the plaintiff would not have
been injured but for the defendant’s failure to take a particular precaution.
As Gilo and Guttel suggest, liability might be imposed for the failure to install noise insulating material in a factory, the failure to use safety railings in
bleachers, the failure to supply a bartender at a party, or the failure to install
a sprinkler system in a classroom—even though these precautions would not
have been cost-justified. In each instance, the plaintiff would have to prove
a causal connection between the defendant’s failure to take the precaution
and the plaintiff’s injury. Thus, although IAL would create a new form of
liability, IAL would also retain a causation requirement analogous to the
traditional cause-in-fact requirement of liability in negligence.
But exactly how would a plaintiff prove causation in such cases? Noise
insulation does not prevent all hearing loss, safety railings do not prevent all
falls, and the presence of a bartender at a party does not prevent all guests
from becoming intoxicated (to use Gilo and Guttel’s own examples). Yet the
success of IAL depends, in part, on the possibility of proving which hearing
losses, falls, or drunken mishaps the precautions in question would have
prevented.
Adducing such proof would actually be extremely difficult in most cases
of IAL. In contrast, traditional tort law does not pose problems of causal
uncertainty in cases such as these. Strict liability depends only on the fact
that the defendant engaged in the activity. Factual causation is also a simple
matter, as it is proven by demonstrating the simple causal connection between engaging in the activity—operating a noisy factory, holding an event
with bleachers, or sponsoring a party and serving alcohol—and the plaintiff’s injury. In these cases, liability attaches regardless of whether greater
precautions would have prevented the injuries at issue. And in traditional
negligence cases, the fact that taking a precaution would substantially reduce the probability of causing harm often provides the decisive proof that
the defendant acted negligently by failing to take that precaution. The “P” in
Judge Learned Hand’s B < PL negligence calculus refers to this probability.
Consequently, plaintiffs in negligence actions seldom face the vexing problem of proving which injuries were caused by the failure to take a costjustified precaution—though proving causation can become a serious issue
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where failure to take the precaution does not substantially increase the probability of harm.
But under IAL, almost by definition, the failure to take the precaution in
question would not substantially increase the probability of harm—because
otherwise, that failure probably would be negligent. As a result, plaintiffs
will seldom have affirmative evidence of factual causation. In the unusual
case where there is evidence relevant to causation, it will likely show that
failure to take the precaution did not substantially increase the probability of
harm—because, otherwise, failure to take the precaution would be negligent. Plaintiffs would only have a reasonable chance of proving causation in
cases that reveal a substantial increase in the probability of causing a very
minor harm or a disproportionately large cost of preventing a substantial
increase in harm. Paradoxically, then, in the very set of cases in which it
might be feasible to impose IAL because there is relevant causation evidence, IAL will not be imposed because the same evidence would show a
low probability of causation. As a consequence, there will actually be very
little IAL in practice.
Unfortunately, Gilo and Guttel barely acknowledge this problem. They
relegate it to a footnote, conceding only that “where optimal investment in
precaution does not entirely remove the risk of harm, proving causation may
present some difficulty . . . .” This is insufficient treatment of the very problem posed by most of their own examples.
II. Optics and Autonomy
Law has an expressive function. It sends a message to those it governs,
to those who enforce it, and to the public at large. Sometimes a message is
just a message. But sometimes the nature of the message influences how
faithfully the rule described by the message will be enforced. The message
IAL sends would likely undermine its enforcement, because IAL ignores—
or at the least appears to ignore—a traditional sphere of autonomy.
At points, Gilo and Guttel contend that IAL would send the message that
defendants should be liable for non-negligent injuries where they have deliberately restricted their activity levels so as to avoid liability in negligence.
That is a bit like holding an actor liable for engaging in otherwise-legitimate
liability avoidance, and is itself likely to provoke an ambivalent reaction by
judges and juries.
But this is not the only reasonable interpretation of IAL. An alternative
interpretation maintains that IAL strongly invades a potential defendant’s
autonomy. This interpretation suggests a judgment that a defendant simply
did not engage in enough of the activity in question—that it did not hire
enough employees, admit enough patrons to its stadium, hold a large enough
party with alcohol, or (as the authors suggest) pollute enough. Whether or
not this is an entirely fair interpretation, it is certainly the message that
many defendants will contend IAL has sent to them, as well as to judges and
juries.
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Yet this message will likely undermine the normative force of the IAL
rule because the law does not ordinarily compel actors to engage in more of
a particular activity. Since IAL crosses into this traditional sphere of autonomy, judges and juries will hesitate to impose it. In an effort to address this
concern, Gilo and Guttel contend that IAL is not liability for nonfeasance,
but for misfeasance, and that IAL therefore does not risk infringing on autonomy in the way that liability for nonfeasance infringes on autonomy.
Calling IAL misfeasance, however, does not neutralize this autonomy concern. Even if IAL stands for something more than nonfeasance, it still
constitutes liability for failing to engage in more of an activity than the actor
has chosen to engage in. And no matter how often economic analysis explains that liability can be understood as a mere price rather than a sanction,
the authors’ very invocation of the term “misfeasance” (otherwise why not
simply call it “feasance?”) to characterize the IAL defendant’s conduct implies that, although the defendant is legally free to incur liability rather than
to increase its activity level, it would be wrong to do the former rather than
the latter.
This would be mere semantics were it not for the fact that the misfeasance in question results from failing to engage in a higher level of activity.
The difference between wrongfully failing to do something and failing to do
something entirely optional is significant. Most forms of insufficient activity
would undoubtedly fall into the latter category. Failing to buy a larger house
than one wanted, or failing to buy more stock than one wished to buy, for
example, would not be considered wrongful or worthy of criticism, whether
inefficient or not. For the same reason, it is prima facie an infringement of
autonomy to impose a “duty mandating adjustment of one’s activity levels”
and to enforce that duty with civil liability, if the adjustment is upward, not
downward.
III. Complicating Trials with Unmanageable Questions of Fact
The general unwillingness of negligence law to assess the optimality of
activity levels avoids the difficulty of weighing the third-party social costs
and benefits of the defendant’s activity. If negligence turned on whether the
defendant engaged in excess activity, then courts would often have to pursue
this difficult fact-finding exercise. Although third-party social costs and
benefits are implicated, in theory, in safety-level disputes, the impact of this
consideration can usually be ignored because it is likely to be small. For
example, the marginal social cost or benefit that accrues to third-parties
when the defendant exceeds the speed limit—faster delivery of goods carried by the defendant—is ordinarily so small that it does not figure in
determinations of negligence.
It is far more difficult to ignore third-party costs and benefits, however,
when the focus is on activity levels—whether allegedly excessive or insufficient activity. We need only to look to Gilo and Guttel’s own examples to
see why. The question of whether it was negligent for a commercial establishment to fail to provide a bartender at a party is circumscribed and
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manageable. The question whether to impose liability for failing to admit
more patrons to the party, however, implicates issues regarding modes of
recreational enjoyment and social intercourse that tort law is ill-equipped to
resolve. The same would be true of the authors’ fire sprinkler example,
which would require an assessment of the educational costs and benefits of
having larger classrooms that could hold more students, in order to determine whether the defendant should be held liable under IAL for the failure
to have used larger classrooms. As was demonstrated decades ago by James
Henderson in Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Law, case-by-case adjudication is not well suited to the determination of
“polycentric” questions such as these.
Gilo and Guttel imply that courts can avoid these problems by focusing
on the set of cases most amenable to the application of IAL. These are cases
in which, among other things, the cost of a precaution at a higher activity
level exceeds the private benefit derived from increasing the activity level,
but that cost is lower than the social gain from the additional activity and the
diminished risk of harm. These cases, however, will not come to the courts
in pre-identified form. Merely suggesting that the cost of obtaining relevant
evidence “might be prohibitive” and that there should be “evaluation of activity levels” where this is “feasible” is not enough, because the parties will
attempt to raise these questions at trial whenever the law permits them to do
so.
Consequently, courts will often have to deal with factual disputes over
whether the defendant’s activity level was sufficient. Parties will introduce
evidence of the social benefits associated with the defendant’s allegedly
insufficient current activity level and the higher, allegedly sufficient level.
Judges and juries will then have to resolve polycentric factual disputes over
the net social costs and benefits of different possible activity levels, and
these disputes will pose even greater problems than questions of optimal
social activity levels where the parties do not dispute the underlying facts.
Finally, Gilo and Guttel neglect another important question: whether the
decision to impose IAL poses a question for the court or for the jury. The
jury decides the question of liability in a standard action for negligence. In
contrast, the court resolves the question in a strict liability action, although it
may submit certain factual questions to the jury. This division of responsibility has significant implications, because in most instances, plaintiffs will
allege other theories of liability in addition to IAL, such as conventional
negligence. If the question of whether to impose IAL is up to the court, then
the jury will likely hear evidence regarding activity levels that will be irrelevant to the negligence question it must decide. On the other hand, if the
jury must decide both negligence and IAL, then the court must instruct the
jury to find the defendant liable if it was negligent, and also liable if it was
not negligent but has engaged in an insufficient amount of the activity otherwise conducted using reasonable care. To the typical jury, this sort of
instruction will seem confusing, counterintuitive, and bizarre.
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All things considered, then, IAL is a prescription for complicating tort
litigation without any evidence, let alone assurance, that the advantages of
IAL will outweigh its significant disadvantages.

